Beyond the Front Line: New Leak Maps 20 Figures Inside the Islamic Republic's State Network

Summary

A new leak identifies 20 individuals connected to the Islamic Republic's wider government, security, intelligence and administrative network. The new release goes beyond frontline security personnel, documenting figures linked to state institutions, intelligence structures, judicial bodies, local authorities, informant networks and other organizations connected to political control.

The importance of the disclosure lies in the relationships between these institutions. Repression does not depend only on officers in the streets. Intelligence personnel can identify activists, administrators can coordinate local structures, prosecutors can pursue detainees, and informants can provide information while holding no visible security position.

Not every person in the database is accused of direct violence. Institutional affiliation, cooperation with security bodies and documented involvement in specific abuses are treated as separate findings.

Verification and the State Network

The identities are assessed through leaked government records, photographs, employment information, archived material, official announcements, witness accounts and other corroborating evidence where available.

Verification can include matching names to government records, comparing photographs, confirming positions and workplaces, and cross-checking institutional or geographic information. AI-assisted enhancement may be used to improve low-resolution images, but enhanced photographs are not treated as independent proof of identity.

The records illustrate how the Islamic Republic's security structure extends beyond the IRGC, Basij and police. Intelligence agencies, prosecutors, universities, municipalities, government offices and state-linked organizations can all intersect with security networks.

This creates a broader system in which individuals may perform very different functions while remaining connected to the same apparatus of surveillance, enforcement and political control.

Repression, Impunity and Why the Leak Matters

Previous protest cycles, including 2009, 2019 and 2022, demonstrated how security operations can combine surveillance, arrests, intelligence gathering, internet restrictions, judicial pressure and direct force.

Repression can also continue after demonstrations end. Authorities may review footage, identify participants, interrogate detainees, prosecute activists or pressure their families. For this reason, documenting administrators, intelligence-linked personnel, prosecutors and institutional intermediaries can be as important as identifying frontline officers.

The new database creates a permanent record of individuals whose roles might otherwise remain hidden inside local institutions or internal government systems. Verified identities and affiliations may later support sanctions, human rights investigations or future accountability proceedings.

The 20-person release therefore provides a broader view of how political authority, surveillance, administration and coercion intersect inside the Islamic Republic.

Identified Individuals Database

The database below contains 20 newly identified individuals connected through leaked records and corroborating evidence to government, security, intelligence, judicial, administrative or state-affiliated institutions.

Photo	Full Name	City / Location	Role / Affiliation	Additional Information
	Saman Bakht-Shahi	Talesh, Gilan	Police Intelligence Informant	Reportedly cooperated with security and law-enforcement authorities during protests.
	Najm al-Din Moradi	Pakdasht, Tehran	IRGC Commander	Commanded security forces during the 2025-2026 protests and was linked to arrests and repression in Pakdasht.
	Saeed Ramezani	Razakan, Karaj	Amol Basij Base Informant	Reportedly involved in shooting during the protests, including an incident that severely injured a 14-year-old.
	Teymour Dowlatyari	Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan	Police Commander	Involved in suppressing protests and the detention and alleged mistreatment of protesters.
	Arsam Shameh-Mohammadi	Golestanak, Karaj	Suppression Force	Identified as a member of the forces involved in suppressing protesters.
	Seyed Omid Hosseini	Fardis, Karaj	Ammar Unit - Alborz Province	Held an intelligence role and was deployed during protests; also assigned to security at the Garmdareh missile site.
	Amin Heydari	Rizakan, Karaj	Ministry of Defense Employee	Linked to IRGC intelligence and Basij-affiliated individuals; accused of monitoring and reporting on local residents.
	Akbar Hedayati	Robat Karim, Tehran	Basij Member, Khatam al-Anbiya Camp	Identified as an individual involved in suppressing public protests.
	Helen Hematian	Shiraz, Fars	Basij Inspector	Linked to Sarallah District and involved in military training, operational activities, and security-related activities.
	Mehdi Kamalzadeh	Fardis, Karaj	Basij Informant, Babol Base	Involved in clashes, alleged use of weapons, and identifying protesters.
	Kianoush Mahmoudi	Shahriar, Tehran	Basij Gym Instructor	Involved in suppressing protests in the Ferdowsieh area.
	Mohammad-Hossein Amargi	Mehran, Ilam	IRGC Informant	Monitored public activities and protests and provided reports during 2025-2026 protests.
	Seyed Reza Sediian	Golshahr	ICHMAF Committee Head	Led and organized security forces during the 2025-2026 protests in Golshahr.
	Khidr Kak Darvishi	Piranshahr, West Azerbaijan	Piranshahr Governor	Responsible for security and law-enforcement responses during the 2022 protests as head of the county Security Council.
	Fayazollah Yari	Shahriar, Tehran	Special Security Forces Official	Involved in suppressing the protests, mass arrests, and pressure on citizens and religious minorities.
	Mojtaba Joudi	Eslamshahr, Tehran	IRGC Member, Baharestan District	Involved in shootings during the 2022 protests and identifying and arresting protesters during the 2025-2026 protests.
	Seyed Mohsen Hosseini	Parand, Tehran	Senior IRGC Commander	Commanded field operations and managed the response to the Dey 1404 protests in Parand.
	Issa Hashemi	Karaj, Alborz	IRIB Services Employee, Basij Member	Participated in identifying people during the 19 Dey events while in plain clothes.
	Farshad Hassan-Nejad	Firuzabad, Fars	Basij Member	Linked to local intelligence authorities and accused of identifying and reporting protesters and activists during protests.
	Mohammad-Javad Falahati-Asboei	Sari, Mazandaran	Commander, Zolfaqar Special Team	Part of Imam Ali Security Battalion and present during the 2019, 2022, and 2025-2026 protests in Sari.